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In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight
is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate
equilibria in these games. We begin by studying Lipschitz games, which encompass, for example, all con-
cave games with Lipschitz continuous payoff functions. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing
approximate equilibria in these games. Then we turn our attention to penalty games, which encompass bi-
ased games and games in which players take risk into account. Here we show that if the penalty function
is Lipschitz continuous, then we can provide a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme. Finally, we
study distance biased games, where we present simple strongly polynomial time algorithms for finding best
responses in L1, L22, and L∞ biased games, and then use these algorithms to provide strongly polynomial
algorithms that find 2/3, 5/7, and 2/3 approximations for these norms, respectively.
CCS Concepts: •Theory of computation→ Exact and approximate computation of equilibria;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Approximate Nash equilibria, Lipschitz games, Concave games, Penalty
games, Biased games
1. INTRODUCTION
The Nash equilibrium [Nash 1951] is the central solution concept that is studied in
game theory. However, recent advances have shown that computing an exact Nash
equilibrium is PPAD-complete [Chen et al. 2009; Daskalakis et al. 2009], and so there
are unlikely to be polynomial time algorithms for this problem. The hardness of com-
puting exact equilibria has lead to the study of approximate equilibria: while an exact
equilibrium requires that all players have no incentive to deviate from their current
strategy, an ǫ-approximate equilibrium requires only that their incentive to deviate is
less than ǫ.
A fruitful line of work has developed studying the best approximations that can
be found in polynomial-time for bimatrix games, which are two-player strategic form
games. There, after a number of papers [Bosse et al. 2010; Daskalakis et al. 2007,
2009], the best known algorithm was given by Tsaknakis and Spirakis [2008], who
provide a polynomial time algorithm that finds a 0.3393-equilibrium. A prominent
open problem is whether there exists a PTAS for this problem. The existence of an
FPTAS was ruled out by Chen et al. [2009] unless PPAD = P. While the existence of a
PTAS remains open, there is however a quasi-polynomial approximation scheme given
by Lipton et al. [2003].
In a strategic form game, the game is specified by giving each player a finite number
of strategies, and then specifying a table of payoffs that contains one entry for every
possible combination of strategies that the players might pick. The players are allowed
to use mixed strategies, and so ultimately the payoff function is a convex combination
of the payoffs given in the table. However, some games can only be modelled in a more
general setting where the action spaces are continuous, or the payoff functions are
non-linear.
For example, Rosen’s seminal work [Rosen 1965] considered a more general setting
of games, called concave games, where each player picks a vector from a convex set. The
payoff to each player is specified by a function that satisfies the following condition: if
every other player’s strategy is fixed, then the payoff to a player is a convex function
over his strategy space. Rosen proved that concave games always have an equilibrium.
A natural subclass of concave games, studied by Caragiannis et al. [2014], is the class
of biased games. A biased game is defined by a strategic form game, a base strategy and
a penalty function. The players play the strategic form game as normal, but they all
suffer a penalty for deviating from their base strategy. This penalty can be a non-linear
function, such as the L22 norm.
In this paper, we study the computation of approximate equilibria in such games.
Our main observation is that Lipschitz continuity of the players’ payoff functions al-
lows us to provide algorithms that find approximate equilibria. Several papers have
studied how the Lipschitz continuity of the players’ payoff functions affects the ex-
istence, the quality, and the complexity of the equilibria of the underlying game.
Azrieli and Shmaya [2013] studied many player games and derived bounds for the
Lipschitz constant of the utility functions for the players that guarantees the exis-
tence of pure approximate equilibrium for the game. Daskalakis and Papadimitriou
[2014] proved that anonymous games posses pure approximate equilibria whose qual-
ity depends on the Lipschitz constant of the payoff functions and the number of pure
strategies the players have and proved that this approximate equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time. Furthermore, they gave a polynomial-time approximation
scheme for anonymous games with many players and constant number of pure strate-
gies. Babichenko [2013] presented a best-reply dynamic for n players Lipschitz anony-
mous games with two strategies which reaches an approximate pure equilibrium in
O(n logn) steps. Recently, Chen et al. [2015] proved that it is PPAD-complete to com-
pute an ǫ-equilibrium in anonymous games with seven pure strategies, when ǫ is expo-
nentially small in the number of the players. Deb and Kalai [2015] studied how some
variants of the Lipschitz continuity of the utility functions are sufficient to guarantee
hindsight stability of equilibria.
1.1. Our contribution.
Lipschitz games. We begin by studying a very general class of games, where each
player’s strategy space is continuous, and represented by a convex set of vectors, and
where the only restriction is that the payoff function is Lipschitz continuous. This
class encompasses, for example, every concave game in which the payoffs are Lips-
chitz continuous. This class is so general that exact equilibria, and even approximate
equilibria may not exist. Nevertheless, we give an efficient algorithm that either out-
puts an ǫ-equilibrium, or determines that game has no exact equilibria. More pre-
cisely, forM player games that are λ-continuous in the Lp norm, for p ≥ 2, and where
γ = max ‖x‖p over all x in the strategy space, we either compute an ǫ-equilibrium or
determine that no exact equilibrium exists in time O
(
MnMk+l
)
, where k = O
(
λ2Mpγ2
ǫ2
)
and l = O
(
λ2pγ2
ǫ2
)
. Observe that this is a polynomial time algorithm when λ, p, γ, M ,
and ǫ are constant.
To prove this result, we utilize a recent result of Barman [2015], which states that
for every vector in a convex set, there is another vector that is ǫ close to the original
in the Lp norm, and is a convex combination of b points on the convex hull, where
b depends on p and ǫ, but does not depend on the dimension. Using this result, and
the Lipschitz continuity of the payoffs, allows us to reduce the task of finding an ǫ-
equilibrium to checking only a small number of strategy profiles, and thus we get a
brute-force algorithm that is reminiscent of the QPTAS given by Lipton et al. [2003]
for bimatrix games.
However, life is not so simple for us. Since we study a very general class of games,
verifying whether a given strategy profile is an ǫ-equilibrium is a non-trivial task. It
requires us to compute a regret for each player, which is the difference between the
player’s best response payoff and their actual payoff. Computing a best response in a
bimatrix game is trivial, but for Lipschitz games, computing a best response may be a
hard problem. We get around this problem by instead giving an algorithm to compute
approximate best responses. Hence we find approximate regrets, and it turns out that
this is sufficient for our algorithm to work.
Penalty games. We then turn our attention to penalty games. In these games, the
players play a strategic form game, and their utility is the payoff achieved in the game
minus a penalty. The penalty function can be an arbitrary function that depends on
the player’s strategy. This is a general class of games that encompasses a number of
games that have been studied before. The biased games studied by Caragiannis et al.
[2014], are penalty games where the penalty is determined by the amount that a
player deviates from a specified base strategy. The biased model was studied in the
past by psychologists [Tversky and Kahneman 1974] and it is close to what they call
anchoring [Chapman and Johnson 1999; Kahneman 1992]. In their seminal paper,
Fiat and Papadimitriou [2010] introduced a model for risk prone games. This model
resembles penalty games since the risk component can be encoded in the penalty func-
tion. Mavronicolas and Monien [2015] followed this line of research and provided re-
sults on the complexity of deciding if such games possess an equilibrium.
We again show that Lipschitz continuity helps us to find approximate equilibria. The
only assumption that we make is that the penalty function is Lipschitz continuous in
an Lp norm with p ≥ 2. Again, this is a weak restriction, and it does not guarantee that
exact equilibria exist. Even so, we give a quasi-polynomial time algorithm that either
finds an ǫ-equilibrium, or verifies that the game has no exact equilibrium.
Our result can be seen as a generalisation of the QPTAS given by Lipton et al. [2003]
for bimatrix games. Their approach is to show the existence of an approximate equi-
librium with a logarithmic support. They proved this via the probabilistic method: if
we know an exact equilibrium of a bimatrix game, then we can take logarithmically
many samples from the strategies, and with positive probability playing the sampled
strategies uniformly will be an approximate equilibrium.
We take a similar approach, but since our games are more complicated, our proof
is necessarily more involved. In particular, for Lipton et al. [2003], proving that the
sampled strategies are an approximate equilibrium only requires showing that the
expected payoff is close the payoff of a pure best response. In penalty games, best
response strategies are not necessarily pure, and so the events that we must consider
are more complex.
Distance biased games. Finally, we consider distance biased games, which are a
subclass of penalty games that have been studied recently by Caragiannis et al. [2014].
They showed that, under very mild assumptions on the bias function, biased games
always have an exact equilibrium. Furthermore, for the case where the bias function
is either the L1 norm, or the L
2
2 norm, they give an exponential time algorithm for
finding an exact equilibrium.
Our results for penalty games already give a QPTAS for biased games, but we are
also interested in whether there are polynomial-time algorithms that can find non-
trivial approximations. We give a positive answer to this question for games where the
bias is the L1 norm, the L
2
2 norm, or the L∞ norm. We follow the well-known approach
of Daskalakis et al. [2009], who gave a simple algorithm for finding a 0.5-approximate
equilibrium in a bimatrix game. Their approach is as follows: start with an arbitrary
strategy x for player 1, compute a best response j for player 2 against x, and then
compute a best response i for player 1 against j. Player 1 mixes uniformly between x
and i, while player 2 plays j.
We show that this algorithm also works for biased games, although the generali-
sation is not entirely trivial. Again, this is because best responses cannot be trivially
computed in biased games. For the L1 and L∞ norms, best responses can be computed
via linear programming, and for the L22 norm, best responses can be formulated as a
quadratic program, and it turns out that this particular QP can be solved in polynomial
time by the ellipsoid method. However, none of these algorithms are strongly polyno-
mial. We show that, for each of the norms, best responses can be found by a simple
strongly-polynomial combinatorial algorithm. We then analyse the quality of approx-
imation provided by the technique of Daskalakis et al. [2009]. We obtain a strongly
polynomial algorithm for finding a 2/3 approximation in L1 and L∞ biased games, and
a strongly polynomial algorithm for finding a 5/7 approximation in L22 biased games.
For the latter result, in the special case where the bias function is the inner product of
the player’s strategy we find a 13/21 approximation.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We start by fixing some notation. For each positive integer n we use [n] to denote
the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, we use ∆n to denote the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex, and ‖x‖p
to denote the p-norm of a vector x ∈ Rd, i.e. ‖x‖p =
(∑
i∈[d] |xi|p
)1/p
. Given a set
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ Rd, we use conv(X) to denote the convex hull of X .
Games and strategies. A game with M -players can be described by a set of avail-
able actions for each player and a utility function for each player that depends both on
his chosen action and the actions the rest of the players chose. For each player i ∈ [M ]
we use Si to denote his set of available actions and we call it strategy space. We will use
xi ∈ Si to denote a specific action chosen by player i and we will call it as the strategy of
player i. Furthermore, we use x = (x1, . . . , xM ) to denote a strategy profile of the game.
We use Ti(xi,x−i) to denote the utility of player i when he plays the strategy xi and
the rest of the players play according to the strategy profile x−i. A strategy xˆi is a best
response against the strategy profile x−i, if Ti(xˆi,x−i) ≥ Ti(xi,x−i) for all xi ∈ Si. The
regret player i suffers under a strategy profile x is the difference between the utility of
his best response and his utility under x, i.e. Ti(xˆi,x−i)− Ti(xi,x−i).
λp-Lipschitz Games. We will use the notion of the λp-Lipschitz continuity.
Definition 2.1 (λp-Lipschitz). A function f : A → R, with A ⊆ Rd is λp-Lipschitz
continuous if for every x and y in A, it is true that |f(x)− f(y)| ≤ λ · ‖x− y‖p.
We call the game L := (M,n, λ, p, γ, T ) λp-Lipschitz if for each player i ∈ [M ]
—the strategy space Si is the convex hull of n vectors y1, . . . , yn in R
d,
—maxxi∈Si ‖xi‖p ≤ γ
—the utility function Ti(x) ∈ T is λp-Lipschitz continuous.
Two Player Penalty Games. A two player penalty game P is defined by a tuple(
R,C, fr(x), fc(y)
)
, where (R,C) is a bimatrix game and fr(x) and fc(y) are the penalty
functions for the row and the column player respectively. The utilities for the players
under a strategy profile (x,y), denoted by Tr(x,y) and Tc(x,y), are given by
Tr(x,y) = x
TRy − fr(x) Tc(x,y) = xTCy − fc(y).
We will use Pλ to denote two player penalty games with λp-Lipschitz penalty functions.
A special class of penalty games is when fr(x) = x
T
x and fc(y) = y
T
y. We call these
games as inner product penalty games.
Two Player Biased Games. This is a subclass of penalty games, where extra con-
straints are added to the penalty functions fr(x) and fc(y) of the players. In this class
of games there is a base strategy and for each player and the penalty they receive is
increasing with the distance between the strategy they choose and their base strategy.
Formally, the row player has a base strategy p ∈ ∆n, the column player has a base
strategy q and their strictly increasing penalty functions are defined as fr(‖x − p‖st )
and fc(‖y − q‖lm) respectively.
Two Player Distance Biased Games. This is a special class of biased games
where the penalty function is a fraction of the distance between the base strategy
of the player and his chosen strategy. Formally, a two player distance biased game B
is defined by a tuple
(
R,C, br(x,p), bc(y,q), dr , dc
)
, where (R,C) is a bimatrix game,
p ∈ ∆n is a base strategy for the row player, q ∈ ∆n is a base strategy for the col-
umn player, br(x,p) = ‖x − p‖st and bc(y,q) = ‖y − q‖lm are penalty functions for the
row and the column player respectively. The utilities for the players under a strategy
profile (x,y), denoted by Tr(x,y) and Tc(x,y), are given by
Tr(x,y) = x
TRy− dr · br(x,p) Tc(x,y) = xTCy − dc · bc(y,q)
where dr and dc are non negative constants.
Solution Concepts. The standard solution concept in game theory is the notion of
equilibrium. A strategy profile is an equilibrium if no player can increase his utility
by unilaterally changing his strategy. A relaxed version of this concept is the approx-
imate equilibrium, or ǫ-equilibrium. Intuitively, a strategy profile is an ǫ-equilibrium
if no player can increase his utility more than ǫ by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Formally, a strategy profile x is an ǫ-equilibrium in a game L if for every player i ∈ [M ]
it holds that
Ti(xi,x−i) ≥ Ti(x′i,x−i)− ǫ for all x′i ∈ Si.
In [Chen et al. 2009] it was proven that, unless P = PPAD, there is no FPTAS for
computing an ǫ-NE in bimatrix games. The same result holds for the class of penalty
games where the penalty functions f for the players depend on n, the size of the under-
lying bimatrix game, and limn→∞ f = 0 for every player. Let P ′ to denote this class of
games.
THEOREM 2.2. Unless P = PPAD, there is no FPTAS for computing an ǫ-equilibrium
in penalty games in P ′.
PROOF. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is an FPTAS for computing
an ǫ-equilibrium for penalty games in P ′. Then given an n × n bimatrix game (R,C),
define the penalty game
(
R,C, fr(x), fc(y)
)
from the family P ′ where limn→∞ fr(x) =
0 and limn→∞ fc(y) = 0. Let (x∗,y∗) be an ǫ-equilibrium for the penalty game. This
means that for all x′ ∈ ∆n it holds that x∗TRy∗ − fr(x∗) ≥ x′TRy∗ − fr(x′) − ǫ or,
equivalently, x∗
T
Ry∗ ≥ x′TRy∗ − ǫ′, where ǫ′ = ǫ+ fr(x∗)− fr(x′). Similarly, x∗TCy∗ ≥
x
∗TCy′ − ǫ′′, where ǫ′′ = ǫ + fc(y∗) − fr(y′). But ǫ′ = ǫ′′ = ǫ when n → ∞. Hence
(x∗,y∗) is a ǫ-NE for the bimatrix game (R,C). This means that if there is an FPTAS
for computing an ǫ-equilibrium in a penalty game in P ′ then there is an FPTAS for
computing an ǫ-NE in (R,C) which is a contradiction, unless P = PPAD.
3. APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIA IN λP -LIPSCHITZ GAMES
In this section, we give an algorithm for computing approximate equilibria in λp Lips-
chitz games. Note that, our definition of a λp-Lipschitz game does not guarantee that
an equilibrium always exists. Our technique can be applied irrespective of whether an
exact equilibrium exists. If an exact equilibrium does exist, then our technique will
always find an ǫ-equilibrium. If an exact equilibrium does not exist, then our then our
algorithm either finds an ǫ-equilibrium or reports that the game does not have an exact
equilibrium.
We will utilize the following theorem that was recently proved in Barman [2015].
THEOREM 3.1 ([BARMAN 2015]). Given a set of vectors X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ Rd,
let conv(X) denote the convex hull of X . Furthermore, let γ := maxx∈X ‖x‖p for some
2 ≤ p < ∞. For every ǫ > 0 and every µ ∈ conv(X), there exists an 4pγ2ǫ2 uniform vector
µ′ ∈ conv(X) such that ‖µ− µ′‖p ≤ ǫ.
If we combine the Theorem 3.1 with the Definition 2.1 we get the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.2. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ Rd, let f : conv(X) → R be a λp-Lipschitz
continuous function for some 2 ≤ p < ∞, let ǫ > 0 and let k = 4λ2pγ2ǫ2 , where γ :=
maxx∈X ‖x‖p. Furthermore, let f(x∗) be the optimum value of f . Then we can compute
a k-uniform point x′ ∈ conv(X) in time O(nk), such that |f(x∗)− f(x′)| < ǫ.
PROOF. From Theorem 3.1 we know that for the chosen value of k there exists a
k-uniform point x′ such that ‖x′ − x∗‖p < ǫ/λ. Since the function f(x) is λp-Lipschitz
continuous, we get that |f(x′) − f(x∗)| < ǫ. In order to compute this point we have to
exhaustively evaluate the function f in all k-uniform points and choose the point that
it maximizes/minimizes its value. Since there are
(
n+k−1
k
)
= O(nk) possible k-uniform
points, the theorem follows.
We now prove our result about Lipschitz games. In what follows we will study a λp-
Lipschitz game L := (M,n, λ, p, γ, T ). Assuming the existence of an exact Nash equilib-
rium, we establish the existence of a k-uniform approximate equilibrium in the game
L, where k depends on M,λ, p and γ. Note that λ depends heavily on p and the utility
functions for the players.
Since by the definition of λp-Lipschitz games the strategy space Si for every player
i is the convex hull of n vectors y1, . . . , yn in R
d, any xi ∈ Si can be written as a con-
vex combination of yjs. Hence, xi =
∑n
j=1 αjyj, where αj > 0 for every j ∈ [n] and∑n
j=1 αj = 1. Then, α = (α1, . . . , αn) is a probability distribution over the vectors
y1, . . . , yn, i.e. vector yj is drawn with probability αj . Thus, we can sample a strategy
xi by the probability distribution α.
So, let x∗ be an equilibrium for L and let x′ be a sampled uniform strategy profile
from x∗. For each player i we define the following events
φi =
{|Ti(x′i,x′−i)− Ti(x∗i ,x∗−i)| < ǫ/2} (1)
πi =
{
Ti(xi,x
′
−i) < Ti(x
′
i,x
′
−i) + ǫ
}
for all possible xi (2)
ψi =
{
‖x′i − x∗i ‖p <
ǫ
2Mλ
}
for some p > 0. (3)
Notice that if all the events πi occur at the same time, then the sampled profile x
′ is
an ǫ-equilibrium. We will show that if for a player i the events φi and
⋂
j ψj hold, then
the event πi has to be true too.
LEMMA 3.3. For all i ∈ [M ] it holds that ⋂j∈[M ] ψj ∩ φi ⊆ πi.
PROOF. Suppose that both events φi and
⋂
j ψj∈[M ] hold.We will show that the event
πi must be true too. Let xi be an arbitrary strategy, let x
∗
−i be a strategy profile for the
rest of the players, and let x′−i be a sampled strategy profile from x
∗
−i. Since we assume
that the events ψj is true for all j we get ‖x′−i − x∗−i‖p ≤
∑
j 6=i ‖x′j − x∗j‖p we get that
‖x′−i − x∗−i‖p ≤
∑
j 6=i
‖x′j − x∗j‖p
≤
∑
j 6=i
ǫ
2Mλ
≤ ǫ
2λ
.
Furthermore, since by assumption the utility functions for the players are λp-Lipschitz
continuous we have that ∣∣Ti(xi,x′−i)− Ti(xi,x∗−i)∣∣ ≤ ǫ2 .
This means that
Ti(xi,x
′
−i) ≤ Ti(xi,x∗−i) +
ǫ
2
≤ Ti(x∗i ,x∗−i) +
ǫ
2
(4)
since Ti(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ Ti(xi,x∗−i) for all possible xi; the strategy profile (x∗i ,x∗−i) is an
equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, since by assumption the event φi is true we get
that
Ti(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) < Ti(x
′
i,x
′
−i) +
ǫ
2
. (5)
Hence, if we combine the inequalities (4) and (5) we get that Ti(xi,x
′
−i) < Ti(x
′
i,x
′
−i)+ ǫ
for all possible xi. Thus, if the events φi and ψj for every j ∈ [M ] hold, then the event
πi holds too.
We are ready to prove the main result of the section.
THEOREM 3.4. In any game λp-Lipschitz game L that posses an equilibrium and
any ǫ > 0, there is a k-uniform strategy profile, with k = 16M
2λ2pγ2
ǫ2 that is an ǫ-
equilibrium.
PROOF. In order to prove the claim, it suffices to show that there is a strategy profile
where every player plays a k-uniform strategy, for the chosen value of k, such that
the events πi hold for all i ∈ [M ]. Since the utility functions in L are λp-Lipschitz
continuous it holds that
⋂
i∈[n] ψi ⊆
⋂
i∈[n] φi. Furthermore, combining that with the
Lemma 3.3 we get that
⋂
i∈[n] ψi ⊆
⋂
i∈[n] πi. Thus, if the event ψi is true for every
i ∈ [n], then the event⋂i∈[n] πi is true as well.
From the Theorem 3.1 we get that for each i ∈ [M ] there is a 16M2λ2pγ2ǫ2 -uniform point
x′i such that the event ψi occurs with positive probability. The claim follows.
Theorem 3.4 establishes the existence of a k-uniform approximate equilibrium, but
this does not immediately give us our approximation algorithm. The obvious approach
is to perform a brute force check of all k-uniform strategies, and then output the one
the provides the best approximation. There is a problem with this, however, since com-
puting the quality of approximation requires us to compute the regret for each player,
which in turn requires us to compute a best response for each player. Computing an
exact best response in a Lipschitz game is a hard problem in general, since we make
no assumptions about the utility functions of the players. Fortunately, it is sufficient
to instead compute an approximate best response for each player, and Lemma 3.2 can
be used to do this. The following Lemma is a consequence of Lemma 3.2.
LEMMA 3.5. Let x be a strategy profile for a λp-Lipschitz game L, and let xˆi be a
best response for the player i against the profile x−i. There is a 4λ
2pγ2
ǫ2 -uniform strategy
x′i that is an ǫ-best response against x−i, i.e. |Ti(xˆi,x−i)− Ti(x′i,x−i)| < ǫ.
Our goal is to approximate the approximation guarantee for a given strategy profile.
More formally, given a strategy profile x that is an ǫ-equilibrium, and a constant δ > 0,
we want an algorithm that outputs a number within the range [ǫ− δ, ǫ+ δ]. Lemma 3.5
allows us to do this. For a given strategy profile x, we first compute δ-approximate
best responses for each player, then we can use these to compute δ-approximate re-
grets for each player. The maximum over the δ-approximate regrets then gives us an
approximation ǫ with a tolerance of δ. This is formalised in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1. Evaluation of approximation guarantee
Input: A strategy profile x for L, and a constant δ > 0.
Output: An additive δ-approximation of the approximation guarantee α(x) for
the strategy profile x.
(1) Set l = 4λ
2pγ2
δ2 .
(2) For every player i ∈ [M ]
(a) For every l-uniform strategy x′i of player i compute Ti(x
′
i,x−i).
(b) Set m∗ = maxx′
i
Ti(x
′
i,x−i).
(c) Set Ri(x) = m∗ − Ti(xi,x−i).
(3) Set α(x) = δ +maxi∈[M ]Ri(x).
(4) Return α(x).
Utilising the above algorithm, we can now produce an algorithm to find an approx-
imate equilibrium in Lipschitz games. The algorithm checks all k-uniform strategy
profiles, using the value of k given by Theorem 3.4, and for each one, computes an
approximation of the quality approximation using the algorithm given above.
Algorithm 2. 3ǫ-equilibrium for λp-Lipschitz game L
Input: Game L and ǫ > 0.
Output: An 3ǫ-equilibrium for L.
(1) Set k > 16λ
2Mpγ2
ǫ2 .
(2) For every k-uniform strategy profile x′
(a) Compute an ǫ-approximation of α(x′).
(b) If the ǫ-approximation of α(x′) is less than 2ǫ, return x′.
If the algorithm returns a strategy profile x, then it must be a 3ǫ equilibrium. This
is because we check that an ǫ-approximation of α(x) is less than 2ǫ, and therefore
α(x) ≤ 3ǫ. Secondly, we argue that if the game has an exact Nash equilibrium, then
this procedure will always output a 3ǫ-approximate equilibrium. From Theorem 3.4
we know that if k > 16λ
2Mpγ2
ǫ2 , then there is a k-uniform strategy profile x that is an
ǫ-equilibrium for L. When we apply our approximate regret algorithm to x, to find an
ǫ-approximation of α(x), the algorithm will return a number that is less than 2ǫ, hence
x will be returned by the algorithm.
To analyse the running time, observe that there are
(
n+k−1
k
)
= O(nk) possible k-
uniform strategies for each player, thus O(nMk) k-uniform strategy profiles. Further-
more, our regret approximation algorithm runs in time O(Mnl), where l = 4λ
2pγ2
ǫ2 .
Hence, we get the next theorem.
THEOREM 3.6. Given a λp-Lipschitz game L that posses an equilibrium and any
ǫ > 0, a 3ǫ-equilibrium can be computed in time O
(
MnMk+l
)
, where k = O
(
λ2Mpγ2
ǫ2
)
and l = O
(
λ2pγ2
ǫ2
)
.
Notice that in might be computationally hard to decide whether a game posses an
equilibrium or not. Nevertheless, our algorithm can be applied in any λp-Lipschitz
game, without being affected by the existence or not of an exact equilibrium. If the
game does not posses an exact equilibrium then our algorithm either finds an approx-
imate equilibrium or decides that there is no k-uniform strategy profile that is an
ǫ-equilibrium for the game, thus the game does not posses an exact equilibrium.
THEOREM 3.7. For any game λp-Lipschitz game L in time O
(
MnMk+l
)
, we can
either compute a 3ǫ-equilibrium, or decide that L does not posses an exact equilibrium,
where k = O
(
λ2Mpγ2
ǫ2
)
and l = O
(
λ2pγ2
ǫ2
)
.
4. A QUASI-POLYNOMIAL ALGORITHM FOR PENALTY GAMES
In this section we present an algorithm that, for any ǫ > 0, can compute an ǫ-
equilibrium for any penalty game in Pλ in quasi-polynomial time. For the algorithm,
we take the same approach as we did in the previous section for Lipschitz games: We
show that if an exact equilibrium exists, then a k-uniform approximate equilibrium al-
ways exists too, and provide a brute-force search algorithm for finding it. Once again,
since best response computation may be hard for this class of games, we must provide
an approximation algorithm for finding the quality of an approximate equilibrium. The
majority of this section is dedicated to proving an appropriate bound for k, to ensure
that k-uniform approximate equilibria always exist.
We first focus on penalty games that posses an exact equilibrium. So, let (x∗,y∗) be
an equilibrium of the game and let (x′,y′) be a k-uniform strategy profile sampled from
this equilibrium. We define the following four events:
φr =
{|Tr(x′,y′)− Tr(x∗,y∗)| < ǫ/2}
πr =
{
Tr(x,y
′) < Tr(x′,y′) + ǫ
}
for all x
φc =
{|Tc(x′,y′)− Tc(x∗,y∗)| < ǫ/2}
πc =
{
Tc(x
′,y) < Tc(x′,y′) + ǫ
}
for all y.
The goal is to derive a value for k such that all the four events above are true, or
equivalently Pr(φr ∩ πr ∩ φc ∩ πr) > 0.
Note that in order to prove that (x′,y′) is an ǫ-equilibrium we only have to consider
the events πr and πc. Nevertheless, as we show in the Lemma 4.1, the events φr and
φc are crucial in our analysis. The proof of the main theorem boils down to the the
events φr and φc. Furthermore, proving that there is a k-uniform profile (x
′,y′) that
fulfills the events φr and φc too, proves that the approximate equilibrium we compute
approximates the utilities the players receive under an exact equilibrium too.
In what follows we will focus only on the row player, since similar analysis can be
applied for the column player too. Firstly we study the event πr and we show how we
can relate it with the event φr.
LEMMA 4.1. For all penalty games it holds that Pr(πcr) ≤ n · e−
kǫ2
2 + Pr(φcr).
PROOF. We begin by introducing the following auxiliary events for all i ∈ [n]
ψri =
{
Riy
′ < Riy∗ +
ǫ
2
}
.
We prove how the events ψri and the event φr are related with the event πr. Assume
that the event φr and the events ψri for all i ∈ [n] are true . Let x be any mixed strategy
for the row player. Since by assumption Riy
′ < Riy∗ + ǫ2 and since x is a probability
distribution, it holds that xTRy′ < xTRy∗ + ǫ2 . If we subtract fr(x) from each side we
get that xTRy′ − fr(x) < xTRy∗ − fr(x) + ǫ2 . This means that Tr(x,y′) < Tr(x,y∗) + ǫ2
for all x. But we know that Tr(x,y
∗) ≤ Tr(x∗,y∗) for all x ∈ ∆n, since (x∗,y∗) is an
equilibrium. Thus, we get that Tr(x,y
′) < Tr(x∗,y∗)+ ǫ2 for all possible x. Furthermore,
since the event φr is true too, we get that Tr(x,y
′) < Tr(x′,y′) + ǫ. Thus, if the events
φr and ψri for all i ∈ [n] are true, then the event πr must be true as well. Formally,
φr
⋂
i∈[n] ψri ⊆ πr. Thus, Pr(πcr) ≤ Pr(φcr) +
∑
i ψri. Using the Hoeffding bound, we get
that Pr(ψcri) ≤ e−
kǫ2
2 for all i ∈ [n]. Our claim follows.
With Lemma 4.1 in hand, we can see that in order to compute a value for k it is suf-
ficient to study the event φr . We introduce the following auxiliary events that we will
study seperately:
φru =
{|x′TRy′ − x∗TRy∗| < ǫ/4}
φrb =
{|fr(x′)− fr(x∗)| < ǫ/4}.
It is easy to see that if both φrb and φruare true, then the event φr must be true too,
formally φrb ∩φru ⊆ φr . Using the analysis from [Lipton et al. 2003] we can prove that
Pr(φcru) ≤ 2e−
kǫ2
8 . Thus, it remains to study the the event φcrb.
LEMMA 4.2. Pr(φcrb) ≤ 8λ
√
p
ǫ
√
k
.
PROOF. Since we assume that the penalty function fr(x
′) is λp-Lipschitz continuous
the event φrb can be replaced by the event φrb′ =
{‖x′ − x∗‖p < ǫ/4λ}. It is easy to see
that φrb ⊆ φrb′ . Then, using the proof of Theorem 2 from [Barman 2015] we get that
E[‖x′ − x∗‖p] ≤ 2
√
p√
k
. Thus, using Markov’s inequality we get that
Pr(‖x′ − x∗‖p ≥ ǫ
4λ
) ≤ E[‖x
′ − x∗‖p]
ǫ
4λ
≤ 8λ
√
p
ǫ
√
k
.
We are ready to prove our theorem
THEOREM 4.3. For any equilibrium (x∗,y∗) of a penalty game from the class Pλ,
any ǫ > 0, and any k ∈ Ω(λ2 logn)ǫ2 , there exists a k-uniform strategy profile (x′,y′) that:
(1) (x′,y′) is an ǫ-equilibrium for the game,
(2) |Tr(x′,y′)− Tr(x∗,y∗)| < ǫ/2,
(3) |Tc(x′,y′)− Tc(x∗,y∗)| < ǫ/2.
PROOF. Let us define the event GOOD = φr ∩ φc ∩ πr ∩ πc. In order to prove our
theorem it suffices to prove that Pr(GOOD) > 0. Notice that for the events φc and πc
we can use the same analysis as for φr and πr and get the same bounds.
Thus, using Lemma 4.1 and the analysis for the events φru and φrb we get that
Pr(GOODc) ≤ Pr(φcr) + Pr(πcr) + Pr(φcc) + Pr(πcc)
≤ 2(Pr(φcr) + Pr(πcr))
≤ 2(2Pr(φcr) + n · e−kǫ22 ) (from Lemma 4.1)
≤ 2(2Pr(φcru) + 2Pr(φcrb′) + n · e− kǫ22 )
≤ 2(4e−kǫ28 + 8λ√p
ǫ
√
k
+ n · e− kǫ
2
2
)
(from Lemma 4.2)
< 1 for the chosen value of k.
Thus, Pr(GOOD) > 0 and our claim follows.
The Theorem 4.3 establishes the existence of a k-uniform strategy profile (x′,y′) that
is an ǫ-equilibrium. However, as with the previous section, we must provide an efficient
method for approximating the quality of approximation provided by a given strategy
profile. To do so, we first give the following lemma, which shows that approximate best
responses can be computed in quasi-polynomial time for penalty games.
LEMMA 4.4. Let (x,y) be a strategy profile for a penalty game Pλ, and let xˆ be a
best response against y. There is an l-uniform strategy x′, with l = 17λ
2√p
ǫ2 , that is an
ǫ-best response against y, i.e. Tr(xˆ,y) < Tr(x
′,y) + ǫ.
PROOF. We will prove that |Tr(xˆ,y) − Tr(x′,y)| < ǫ which implies our claim. Let
φ1 = {|xˆTRy − x′TRy| ≤ ǫ/2} and φ2 = {|fr(xˆ) − fr(x′)| < ǫ/2} Notice that Lemma 4.2
does not use anywhere the fact that x∗ is an equilibrium strategy, thus it holds
even if x∗ is replaced by xˆ. Thus, Pr(φc2) ≤ 4λ
√
p
ǫ
√
k
. Furthermore, using the analysis
from [Lipton et al. 2003] again, we can prove that Pr(φc1) ≤ 2e−
kǫ2
4 and using similar
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.3 it can be easily proved that for the chosen
of l it holds that Pr(φc1) + Pr(φ
c
2) < 1, thus the events φ1 and φ2 occur with positive
probability and our claim follows.
Having given this Lemma, we can reuse Algorithm 1, but with l set equal to
17λ2
√
p
ǫ2 ,
to provide an algorithm that aproximates the quality of approximation of a given strat-
egy profile. Then, we can reuse Algorithm 2 with k = Ω(λ
2 logn)
ǫ2 to provide a quasi-
polynomial time algorithm that finds approximate equilibia in penalty games. Notice
again that our algorithm can be applied in games that it is computationally hard to
verify whether an exact equilibrium exists. Our algorithm either will compute an ap-
proximate equilibrium or it will fail to find one, thus it will decide that the game does
not posses an exact equilibrium.
THEOREM 4.5. In any penalty game Pλ with constant number of players and any
ǫ > 0, in quasi polynomial time we can either compute a 3ǫ-equilibrium, or decide that
Pλ does not posses an exact equilibrium.
5. DISTANCE BIASED GAMES
In this section, we focus on three particular classes of distance biased games, and we
provide polynomial-time approximation algorithms for these games. We focus on the
following three penalty functions:
—L1 penalty: br(x,p) = ‖x− p‖1 =
∑
i |xi − pi|.
—L22 penalty: br(x,p) = ‖x− p‖22 =
∑
i(xi − pi)2.
—L∞ penalty: br(x,p) = ‖x− p‖∞ = maxi |xi − pi|.
Our approach is to follow the well-known technique of Daskalakis et al. [2009] that
finds a 0.5-NE in a bimatrix game. The algorithm that we will use for all three penalty
functions is given below.
Algorithm 3. The Base Algorithm
(1) Compute a best response y∗ against p.
(2) Compute a best response x against y∗.
(3) Set x∗ = δ · p+ (1− δ) · x, for some δ ∈ [0, 1].
(4) Return the strategy profile (x∗,y∗).
While this is a well-known technique for bimatrix games, note that it cannot im-
mediately be applied to penalty games. This is because the algorithm requires us to
compute two best response strategies, and while computing a best-response is trivial
in bimatrix games, this is not the case for penalty games. Best responses for L1 and
L∞ penalties can be computed in polynomial-time via linear programming, and for
L22 penalties, the ellipsoid algorithm can be applied. However, these methods do not
provide strongly polynomial algorithms.
In this section, for each of the penalties, we develop a simple combinatorial algorithm
for computing best response strategies for each of these penalties. Our algorithms are
strongly polynomial. Then, we determine the quality of the approximation given by the
base algorithm when our best response techniques are used. In what follows we make
the common assumption that the payoffs of the underlying bimatrix game (R,C) are
in [0, 1].
5.1. A 2/3-approximation algorithm for L1-biased games
We start by considering L1-biased games. Suppose that we want to compute a best-
response for the row player against a fixed strategy y of the column player. We will
show that best response strategies in L1-biased games have a very particular form: if
b is the best response strategy in the (unbiased) bimatrix game (R,C), then the best-
response places all of its probability on b except for a certain set of rows S where it is
too costly to shift probability away from p. The rows i ∈ S will be played with pi to
avoid taking the penalty for deviating.
The characterisation for whether it is too expensive to shift away from p is given by
the following lemma.
LEMMA 5.1. Let j be a pure strategy, let k be a pure strategy with pk > 0, and let
x be a strategy with xk = pk. The utility for the row player increases when we shift
probability from k to j if and only if Rjy −Rky − 2dr > 0.
PROOF. Suppose that we shift δ probability from k to j, where δ ∈ (0,pk]. Then the
utility for the row player is equal to Tr(x,y)+δ ·(Rjy−Rky−2dr), where the final term
is the penalty for shifting away from k. Thus, the utility for the row player increases
under this shift if and only if Rjy −Rky − 2dr > 0.
Observe that, if we are able to shift probability away from a strategy k, then we should
obviously shift it to a best response strategy for the (unbiased) bimatrix game, since
this strategy maximizes the increase in our payoff. Hence, our characterisation of best
response strategies is correct. This gives us the following simple algorithm for comput-
ing best responses.
Algorithm 4. Best Response Algorithm for L1 penalty
(1) Set S = 0.
(2) Compute a best response b against y in the unbiased bimatrix game (R,C).
(3) For each index i 6= b in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
(a) If Rb · y −Ri · y − 2dr ≤ 0, then set xi = pi and S = S + pi.
(b) Otherwise set xi = 0
(4) Set xb = 1− S.
(5) Return x.
Our characterisation has a number of consequences. Firstly, it can be seen that if
dr ≥ 1/2, then there is no profitable shift of probability between any two pure strate-
gies, since 0 ≤ Riy ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Thus, we get the following corollary.
COROLLARY 5.2. If dr ≥ 1/2, then p is a dominant strategy.
Moreover, since we can compute a best response in polynomial time we get the next
theorem.
THEOREM 5.3. In biased games with L1 penalty functions and max{dr, dc} ≥ 1/2,
an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Finally, using the characterization of best responses we can see that there is a con-
nection between the equilibria of the distance biased game and the well supported
Nash equilibria (WSNE) of the underlying bimatrix game.
THEOREM 5.4. Let B = (R,C, br(x,p), bc(y,q), dr , dc) be a distance biased game
with L1 penalties and let d := max{dr, dc}. Any equilirbium of B is a 2d-WSNE for the
bimatrix game (R,C).
PROOF. Let (x∗,y∗) be an equilibrium for B. From the best response Algorithm for
L1 penalty games we can see that x
∗
i > 0 if and only ifRb ·y∗−Ri ·y∗−2dr ≤ 0, where b is
a pure best response against y∗. This means that for every i ∈ [n] with x∗i > 0, it holds
that Ri ·y∗ ≥ maxj∈[n] Rj ·y∗−2d. Similarly, it holds that CTi ·x∗ ≥ maxj∈[n] CTj ·x∗−2d
for all i ∈ [n] with y∗i > 0. This is the definition of a 2d-WSNE for the bimatrix game
(R,C).
5.1.1. Approximation algorithm. We now analyse the approximation guarantee provided
by the base algorithm for L1-biased games. So, let (x
∗,y∗) be the strategy profile the is
returned by the base algorithm. Since we have already shown that exact Nash equilib-
ria can be found in games with either dc ≥ 1/2 or dr ≥ 1/2, we will assume that both
dc and dr are less than 1/2, since this is the only interesting case.
We start by considering the regret of the row player. The following lemma will be
used in the analysis of all three of our approximation algorithms.
LEMMA 5.5. Under the strategy profile (x∗,y∗) the regret for the row player is at
most δ.
PROOF. Notice that for all i ∈ [n] we have
|δpi + (1− δ)xi − pi| = (1− δ)|xi − pi|,
hence ‖x∗−p‖1 = (1−δ)‖x−p‖1 and ‖x∗−p‖∞ = (1−δ)‖x−p‖∞. Furthermore, notice
that
∑
i
(
(1 − δ)xi + δpi − pi
)2
= (1 − δ)2‖x − p‖22, thus ‖x∗ − p‖22 ≤ (1 − δ)‖x − p‖22.
Hence the payoff for the row player it holds Tr(x
∗,y∗) ≥ δ · Tr(p,y∗) + (1− δ) ·Tr(x,y∗)
and his regret under the strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is
Rr(x∗,y∗) = max
x˜
Tr(x˜,y
∗)− Tr(x∗,y∗)
= Tr(x,y
∗)− Tr(x∗,y∗) (since x is a best response against y∗)
≤ δ(Tr(x,y∗)− Tr(p,y∗))
≤ δ (since max
x
Tr(x,y
∗) ≤ 1 and Tr(p,y∗) ≥ 0).
Next, we consider the regret of the column player. The following lemma will be used
for both the L1 case and the L∞ case. Observe that in the L1 case, the precondition of
dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1 always holds, since we have ‖y∗ − q‖1 ≤ 2, thus dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1 since
we are only interested in the case where dc ≤ 1/2.
LEMMA 5.6. If dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1, then under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) the column
player suffers at most 2− 2δ regret.
PROOF. The regret of the column player under the strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is
Rc(x∗,y∗) = max
y
Tc(x
∗,y)− Tc(x∗,y∗)
= max
y
{
(1− δ)Tc(x,y) + δTc(p,y)
)}− (1− δ)Tc(x,y∗)− δTc(p,y∗)
≤ (1 − δ)(max
y
Tc(x
∗,y) − Tc(x,y∗)
)
(since y∗ is a best response against p)
≤ (1 − δ)(1 + dc · bc(y∗,q)) (since max
x
Tc(x
∗,y) ≤ 1)
≤ (1 − δ) · 2 (since dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1).
To complete the analysis, we must select a value for δ that equalises the two regrets.
It can easily be verified that setting δ = 2/3 ensures that δ = 2 − 2δ, and so we have
the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.7. In biased games with L1 penalties a 2/3-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
5.2. A 5/7-approximation algorithm for L22-biased games
We now turn our attention to biased games with an L22 penalty. Again, we start by
giving a combinatorial algorithm for finding a best response. Throughout this section,
we fix y as a column player strategy, and we will show how to compute a best response
for the row player.
Best responses in L22-biased games can be found by solving a quadratic program,
and actually this particular quadratic program can be solved via the ellipsoid algo-
rithm [Kozlov et al. 1980]. We will give a simple combinatorial algorithm that uses
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, and produces a closed formula for the so-
lution. Hence, we will obtain a strongly polynomial time algorithm for finding best
responses.
Our algorithm can be applied on L22 penalty functions and any value dr, but for
notation simplicity we describe our method for dr = 1. Furthermore, we define αi :=
Riy + 2pi and we call αi as the payoff of pure strategy i. Then, the utility for the row
player can be written as Tr(x,y) =
∑n
i=1 xi · αi −
∑n
i=1 x
2
i − pTp. Notice that the term
p
T
p is a constant and it does not affect the solution of the best response; so we can
exclude it from our computations. Thus, a best response for the row player against
strategy y is the solution of the following quadratic program
maximize
n∑
i=1
xi · αi −
n∑
i=1
x
2
i
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n].
The Lagrangian function for this problem is
L(x,y, λ,u) =
n∑
i=1
xi · αi −
n∑
i=1
x
2
i − λ(
n∑
i=1
xi − 1)−
n∑
i=1
uixi
and the corresponding KKT conditions
αi − λ− 2xi − ui = 0 for all i ∈ [n] (6)
n∑
i=1
xi = 1 (7)
xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] (8)
xi · ui = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. (9)
Constraints (6)-(8) are the stationarity conditions and (9) are the complementarity
slackness conditions. We say that strategy x is a feasible response if it satisfies the KKT
conditions. The obvious way to compute a best response is by exhaustively checking all
2n possible combinations for the complementarity conditions and choose the feasible
response that maximizes the utility for a player. Next we prove how we can bypass the
brute force technique and compute all best responses in polynomial time.
In what follows, without loss of generality, we assume that α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αn. That is,
the pure strategies are ordered according to their payoffs. In the next lemma we prove
that in every best response, if a player plays pure strategy l with positive probability,
then he must play every pure strategy k with k < l with positive probability.
LEMMA 5.8. In every best response x∗ if x∗l > 0 then x
∗
k > 0 for all k < l.
PROOF. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is a best response x∗ and
a k < l such that x∗l > 0 and x
∗
k = 0. Let us denoteM =
∑
i6={l,k} αi · x∗i −
∑
i6={l,k} x
∗2
i .
Suppose now that we shift some probability, denoted by δ, from pure strategy l to pure
strategy k. Then his utility is Tr(x
∗,y) =M +αl · (x∗l − δ)− (x∗l − δ)2+αk · δ− δ2, which
is maximized for δ =
αk−αl+2x∗l
4 . Notice that δ > 0 since αk ≥ αl and x∗l > 0, thus the
row player can increase his utility by assigning positive probability to pure strategy k
which contradicts the fact that x∗ is a best response.
Lemma 5.8 implies that there are only n possible supports that a best response can
use. Indeed, we can exploit the KKT conditions to derive, for each candidate support,
the exact probability that each pure strategy would be played. We derive the proba-
bility as a function of αis and of the support size. Suppose that the KKT conditions
produce a feasible response when we set the support to have size k. From condition (6)
we get that xi =
1
2 (αi − λ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and zero else. But we know that
∑k
j xj = 1.
Thus we get that
∑k
j=1
1
2 (αj − λ) = 1 and if we solve for λ get that λ =
∑k
j=1
αj−2
k . This
means that for all i ∈ [k] we get
xi =
1
2
(
αi −
∑k
j=1 αj − 2
k
)
. (10)
So, our algorithm does the following. It loops through all n candidate supports for a
best response. For each one, it uses Equation (10) to determine the probabilities, and
then checks whether these satisfy the KKT conditions, and thus if this is a feasible
response. If it is, then it is saved for in a list of feasible responses, otherwise it is
discarded. After all n possibilities have been checked, the feasible response with the
highest payoff is then returned.
Algorithm 5. Best Response Algorithm for L22 penalty
(1) For i = 1 . . . n
(a) Set x1 ≥ . . . ≥ xi > 0 and xi+1 = . . . = xn = 0.
(b) Check if there is a feasible response under these constraints.
(c) If so, add it to the list of feasible responses.
(2) Among the feasible responses choose one with the highest utility.
5.2.1. Approximation Algorithm. We now show that the base algorithm gives a 5/7-
approximation when applied to L22-penalty games. For the row player’s regret, we
can use Lemma 5.5 to show that the regret is bounded by δ. However, for the column
player’s regret, things are more involved. We will show that the regret of the column
player is at most 2.5 − 2.5δ. That analysis depends on the maximum entry of the base
strategy q and more specifically on whether maxk{qk} ≤ 1/2 or not.
LEMMA 5.9. If maxk{qk} ≤ 1/2, then the regret the column player suffers under
strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is at most 2.5− 2.5δ.
PROOF. Note that when maxk{qk} ≤ 1/2, then bc = ‖y − p‖22 ≤ 1.5 for all possible
y. Then, using the analysis from Lemma 5.6, along with the fact that dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 2
for L22 penalties, and since by assumption dc = 1, the claim follows.
For the case where there is a k such that qk > 1/2 amore involved analysis is needed.
The first goal is to prove that under any strategy y∗ that is a best response against p
the pure strategy k is played with positive probability. In order to prove that, first it
is proven that there is a feasible response against strategy p where pure strategy k is
played with positive probability. In what follows we denote αi := C
T
i p+ 2qi.
LEMMA 5.10. Let qk > 1/2 for some k ∈ [n]. Then there is a feasible response where
pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
PROOF. Note that αk > 1 since by assumption qk > 1/2. Recall from Equation (10)
that in a feasible response y it holds that yi =
1
2
(
αi −
∑
k
j=1 αj−2
k
)
.
In order to prove the claim it is sufficient to show that yk > 0 when in the KKT
conditions is set yi > 0 for all i ∈ [k]. Or equivalently, to show that αk −
∑
k
j=1
αj−2
k =
1
k
(
(k − 1)αk + 2−
∑k−1
j=1 αj
)
> 0. But,
(k − 1)αk + 2−
k−1∑
j=1
αj > k + 1−
k−1∑
j=1
(
CTx+ 2qi
)
(since αk > 1)
≥ k + 1− (k − 1)−
k−1∑
j=1
2qi
≥ 1 + qk (since q ∈ ∆n)
> 0.
The claim follows.
Next it is proven that the utility of the column player is increasing when he adds
pure strategies i in his support such that αi > 1.
LEMMA 5.11. Let yk and yk+1 be two feasible responses with support size k and
k + 1 respectively, where αk+1 > 1. Then Tc(x,y
k+1) > Tc(x,y
k).
PROOF. Let yk be a feasible response with support size k for the column player
against strategy p and let λ(k) :=
∑
k
j=1
αj−2
2k . Then the utility of the column player
when he plays yk can be written as
Tc(x,y
k) =
n∑
i=1
y
k
i · αi −
n∑
i=1
(xki )
2 − qTq
=
k∑
i=1
y
k
i
(
αi − yki
)− qTq
=
k∑
i=1
(αi
2
− λ(k)
) (αi
2
+ λ(k)
)
− qTq
=
1
4
k∑
i=1
α2i − k ·
(
λ(k)
)2 − qTq.
The goal now is to prove that Tc(x,y
k+1) − Tc(x,yk) > 0. By the previous analysis for
Tc(x,y
k) and if A :=
∑k
i=1 αi − 2, then
Tc(x,y
k+1)− Tc(x,yk) = 1
4
k+1∑
i=1
α2i − (k + 1)
(
λ(k + 1)
)2 − 1
4
k∑
i=1
α2i + k ·
(
λ(k)
)2
=
1
4
(
α2k+1 +
A2
k
− (A+ αk+1)
2
k + 1
)
=
1
4
(
α2k+1 +
1
k + 1
(A2 − α2k+1 − 2Aαk+1)
)
=
1
4(k + 1)
(
kα2k+1 +A
2 − 2Aαk+1
)
>
1
4(k + 1)
(
k +A2 − 2A) (since 1 < αk+1 ≤ 2 and A > k − 2)
>
1
4(k + 1)
(
k2 − 5k + 8) (since A > k − 2)
> 0.
Notice that αk ≥ 2pk > 1. Thus, the utility of the feasible response that assigns pos-
itive probability to pure strategy k is strictly greater than the utility of any feasible
responses that does not assign probability to k. Thus strategy k is always played in a
best response. Hence, the next lemma follows.
LEMMA 5.12. If there is a k ∈ [n] such that qk > 1/2, then in every best response y∗
the pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
Using now Lemma 5.12 we can provide a better bound for the regret the column player
suffers, since in every best response y∗ the pure strategy k is played with positive
probability.
LEMMA 5.13. Let y∗ be a best response when there is a pure strategy k with qk >
1/2. Then the regret for the column player under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is bounded by
2− 2δ.
PROOF. Before we proceed with our analysis we assume without loss of generality
that k = 1. Recall from the analysis for the Algorithm 1 that the regret for the column
player is
Rc(x∗,y∗) ≤ (1− δ)
(
max
y˜∈∆
{xˆTCy˜}+ 2y˜Tqk − 2y∗
T
q+ y∗
T
y
∗
)
≤ (1− δ)(1 + 2qk − 2y∗T q+ y∗T y∗). (11)
We focus now on the term y∗
T
y
∗−2y∗Tq. It can be proven 1 that y∗T y∗−2y∗T q ≤ 1−2qk.
Thus, from (11) we get that Rc(x∗,y∗) ≤ 2− 2δ.
Recall now that the regret for the row player is bounded by δ, so if we optimize
with respect to δ the regrets are equal for δ = 2/3. Thus, the next theorem follows,
since when the there is a k with qk > 1/2 the Algorithm 1 produces a 2/3-equilibrium.
Hence, combining this with Lemma 5.9 the Theorem 5.14 follows for δ = 5/7.
1Appendix A
THEOREM 5.14. In biased games with L22 penalties a 5/7-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
5.3. Inner product penalty games
We observe that we can also tackle the case where the penalty function is the inner
product of the strategy played, i.e. p = q = 0. For these games, that we call inner
product penalty games, we replace p as the starting point of the base algorithm with
the fully mixed strategy xn. Hence, for that case x∗ = δ · xn + (1 − δ) · x for some
δ ∈ [0, 1]. In Appendix ?? we prove the next theorem. Again, the regret the row player
suffers under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is bounded by δ.
LEMMA 5.15. When the penalty function is the inner product of the strategy played,
then the regret for the row player under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is bounded by δ.
Furthermore, using similar analysis as in Lemma 5.6 it can be proven that the regret
for the column player under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is bounded by (1−δ)(1+dc ·y∗T y∗).
For the column player we will distinguish between the cases where dc ≤ 1/2 and dc >
1/2. For the first case where dc ≤ 1/2 it is easy see that the algorithm produces a 0.6-
equilibrium. For the other case, when dc > 1/2, first it is proven that there is no pure
best response.
LEMMA 5.16. If the penalty for the column player is equal to yTy and dc >
1
2 , then
there is no pure best response against any strategy of the row player.
PROOF. Let Cj to denote the payoff of the column player from his j-th pure strat-
egy against some strategy x played by the row player. For the sake of contradiction,
assume that there is a pure best response for the column player where, without loss of
generality, he plays only his first pure strategy. Suppose now that he shifts some prob-
ability to his second strategy, that is he plays the first pure strategy with probability x
and the second pure strategy with probability 1 − x. The utility for the column player
under this mixed strategy is x ·C1+(1−x) ·C2−dc · (x2+(1−x)2), which is maximized
for x = 2dc+C1−C24dc . Notice that x > 0, which means that the column player can deviate
from the pure strategy and increase his utility. The claim follows.
With Lemma 5.16 in hand, it can be proven that when dc > 1/2 the column player
does not play any pure strategy with probability greater than 3/4.
LEMMA 5.17. If dc > 1/2, then in y
∗ no pure strategy is played with probability
greater than 3/4.
PROOF. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is a pure strategy i in y∗
that is played with probability greater than 3/4. Furthermore, let k be the support size
of y∗. From Lemma 5.16, since dc > 1/2, we know that there is no pure best response,
thus k ≥ 2. Then using Equation (10) we get that 34 < 12
(
αi−
∑
k
j=1 αj−2
k
)
. If we solve for
αj we get that αi >
3k−4
2k−2 > 1 which is a contradiction since when q = 0 it holds that
αi = C
T
i x ≤ 1.
A direct corollary from Lemma 5.17 is that y∗
T
y
∗ ≤ 5/8. Hence, we can prove the
following lemma.
LEMMA 5.18. Under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) the regret for the column player is
bounded by 138 (1− δ).
PROOF. Firstly, note that Tc(x
∗,y∗) = δxn
T
Cy∗ + (1 − δ)xTCy∗ − y∗T y∗. Moreover,
maxy˜∈∆{xnTCy˜− y˜T y˜}−Tc(xn,y∗) = 0, since y∗ is a best response against xn. Finally,
notice that 0 ≤ yTy ≤ 1 for all y. Thus, the regret for the column player is
Rc(x∗,y∗) = (1 − δ)
(
max
y˜∈∆
{xTCy˜ − y˜T y˜} − xTCy∗ + y∗T y∗
)
< (1 − δ)(1 + 5
8
)
.
which matches the claimed result.
If we combine Lemmas 5.15 and 5.18 and solve for δ we can see that the regrets are
equal for δ = 1321 . Thus, we get the following theorem for biased games where q = 0.
THEOREM 5.19. The strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is a 1321 -equilibrium for biased games
with q = 0.
5.4. A 2/3-approximation for L∞-biased games
Finally, we turn our attention to the L∞ penalty. We start by giving a combinatorial
algorithm for finding best responses. Similar to the best response Algorithm for the
L1 penalty, the intuition is to start from the base strategy p of the row player and
shift probability from pure strategies with low payoff to pure strategies with higher
payoff. This time though, the shifted probability will be distributed between the pure
strategies with higher payoff.
Without loss of generality assume that R1y ≥ . . . ≥ Rny, ie., that the strategies
are ordered according to their payoff in the unbiased bimatrix game. The set of pure
strategies of the row player can be partitioned into three disjoint sets according to the
payoff they yield:
H := {i ∈ [n] : Riy = R1y}
M := {i ∈ ([n] \ H) : R1y −Riy − dr < 0}
L := {i ∈ [n] : R1y −Riy − dr > 0}.
Next we giver an algorithm that computes a best response for L∞ penalty.
Algorithm 6. Best Response Algorithm for L∞ penalty
(1) For all i ∈ L, set xi = 0.
(2) If P ≤ |H| · pmax, then set xi = pi + P|H| for all i ∈ H and xj = pj for j ∈M.
(3) Else if P < |H ∪M| · pmax, then
—Set xi = pi + pmax for all i ∈ H.
— Set k = ⌊P−|H|·pmaxpmax ⌋.
— Set xi = pi + pmax for all i ≤ |H|+ k.
— Set x|H|+k+1 = p|H|+k+1 + P − (|H|+ k) · pmax.
— Set xj = pj for all |H|+ k + 2 ≤ j ≤ |H|+ |M|.
(4) Else set xi = pi +
P
|H∪M| for all i ∈ H ∪M.
Let pmax := maxi∈L pi and let P :=
∑
i∈L pi. Then for every best response the follow-
ing lemma holds.
LEMMA 5.20. If L 6= ∅, then for any best response x of the row player against strat-
egy y it holds that ‖x− p‖∞ ≥ pmax. Else p is the best response.
PROOF. Using similar arguments as in Lemma 5.1, it can be proven that if there are
no pure strategies i and k such that Rky−Riy−dr < 0 then any shifting of probability
decreases the utility of the row player. Thus, the best response of the player is p. On
the other hand, if there are strategies i and k such that Rky − Riy − dr > 0, then the
utility of the row player increase if all the probability from strategy i is shifted to pure
strategy k. The set L contains all these pure strategies. Let j ∈ L be the pure strategy
that defines pmax. Then, all the pmax probability can be shifted from j to the a pure
strategy in H, i.e. a pure strategy that yields the highest payoff, and strictly increase
the utility of the player. Thus, the strategy j is played with zero probability and the
claim follows.
In what follows assume that L 6= ∅, hence pmax > 0. From Lemma 5.20 follows
that there is a best response where the strategy with the highest payoff is played
with probability p1 + pmax. Hence, it can be shifted up to pmax probability from pure
strategies with lower payoff to each pure strategy with higher payoff, starting from
the second pure strategy etc. After this shift of probabilities there will be a set of pure
strategies that where each one is played with probability pi + pmax and possibly one
pure strategy j that is played with probability less or equal to pj . The question is
whether more probability should be shifted from the low payoff strategies to strategies
that yield higher payoff. The next lemma establishes that no pure strategy form L is
played with positive probability in any best response against y.
LEMMA 5.21. In every best response against strategy y all pure strategies i ∈ L are
played with zero probability.
PROOF. LetK denote denote the set of pure strategies that are played with positive
probability after the first shifting of probabilities. Without loss of generality assume
that each strategy i ∈ K is played with probability pi + pmax. Then the utility of the
player under this strategy is equal to U =
∑
i∈K(pi + pmax) · Riy − dr · pmax. For the
sake of contradiction, assume that there is one strategy j from L that belongs to K.
Suppose that probability δ is shifted from the strategy j to the first pure strategy. Then
the utility for the player is equal to U + δ(R1y−Rjy− dr) > U , since by definition of L
R1y−Rjy− dr > 0. Thus, the utility of the player is increasing if probability is shifted.
Notice that the analysis holds even if the penalty is pmax + δ instead of pmax, thus the
claim follows.
Thus, all the probability P from strategies from L should be shifted to strategies
yield higher payoff. The question now is what is the optimal way to distribute that
probability over the strategies with the higher payoff. Clearly, the same amount of
probability should be shifted in all strategies in H since it makes the penalty smaller.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that the maximum amount of probability is shifted to
strategies in H. Next we prove that if P ≥ pmax · (|H| + |M|) then P is uniformly
distributed over the pure strategies in H ∪M.
PROOF. If P ≥ pmax · (|H|+ |M|) then there is a best response where the probability
P is uniformly distributed over the pure strategies in H ∪M.
PROOF. Let |H|+ |M| = k and S = P − k · pmax. Let
U =
∑
i∈H∪M
(pi + pmax +
S
k
)Riy − dr(pmax + S
k
))
be the utility when the probability S is distributed uniformly over all pure strategies
in H ∪M. Furthermore, let U ′ be the utility when δ > 0 probability is shifted from
a pure strategy j to the first pure strategy that yields the highest payoff. Then U ′ =
U + δ(R1y−Rjy− dr), but R1y−Rjy− dr ≤ 0 since j ∈ H ∪M. The claim follows.
Using the previous analysis the correctness of the algorithm follows.
Note that, using similar arguments as in Lemma 5.1 the next lemma can be proved.
LEMMA 5.22. If dr ≥ 1, then p is a dominant strategy.
Furthermore, the combination of Lemma 5.22 with the fact that best responses can
be computed in polynomial time gives the next theorem.
THEOREM 5.23. In biased games with L∞ penalty functions and max{dr, dc} ≥ 1,
an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Again we can see that there is a connection between the equilibria of the distance bi-
ased game and the well supported Nash equilibria (WSNE) of the underlying bimatrix
game.
OBSERVATION 1. Let B = (R,C, br(x,p), bc(y,q), dr , dc) be a distance biased game
with L∞ penalties and let d := max{dr, dc}. Any equilirbium of B is a d-WSNE for the
bimatrix game (R,C).
5.4.1. Approximation algorithm. For the quality of approximation, we can reuse the re-
sults that we proved for the L1 penalty. Lemma 5.5 applies unchanged. For Lemma 5.6,
we observe that dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1 when the penalty bc(y∗,q) is the L∞ norm, since for
this case it holds ‖y∗ − q‖∞ ≤ 1 and it is assumed that dc ≤ 1. Thus, we have the
following theorem.
THEOREM 5.24. In biased games with L∞ penalties a 2/3-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied games with infinite action spaces, and non-linear payoff functions.
We have shown that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function can be exploited to
provide algorithms that find approximate equilibria. For Lipschitz games, we showed
that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide an efficient algo-
rithm for finding approximate equilibria. For penalty games, the Lipschitz continuity
of the penalty function allows us to provide a QPTAS. Finally, we provided strongly
polynomial approximation algorithms for L1, L
2
2, and L∞ distance biased games.
Several open questions stem from our paper. The most important one is to under-
stand the exact computational complexity of equilibrium computation in Lipschitz and
penalty games. Although Theorem 2.2 states that there no FPTAS for penalty games,
the result holds only for games with penalty functions that depend on the size of the
game and tend to zero as the size grows. Another interesting feature is that we cannot
verify efficiently in all penalty games whether a given strategy profile is an equilib-
rium, and so it seems questionable whether PPAD can capture the full complexity of
penalty games. On the other side, for the distance biased games that we studied in
this paper, we have shown that we can decide in polynomial time if a strategy profile
is an equilibrium. Is the equilibrium computation problem PPAD-complete for the two
classes of games we studied? Are there any subclasses of penalty games, e.g. when the
underlying normal form game is zero sum, that are easy to solve?
Another obvious direction is to derive better polynomial time approximation guar-
antees under for biased games. We believe that the optimization approach used
by Tsaknakis and Spirakis [2008] and Deligkas et al. [2015] might tackle this problem.
Under the L1 penalties the analysis of the steepest descent algorithm may be similar
to Deligkas et al. [2015] and therefore we may be able to obtain a constant approxima-
tion guarantee similar to the bound of 0.5 that was established in that paper. The other
known techniques that compute approximate Nash equilibria [Bosse et al. 2010] and
approximate well supported Nash equilibria [Czumaj et al. 2015; Fearnley et al. 2012;
Kontogiannis and Spirakis 2010] solve a zero sum bimatrix game in order to derive
the approximate equilibrium, and there is no obvious way to generalise this approach
in penalty games.
REFERENCES
Yaron Azrieli and Eran Shmaya. 2013. Lipschitz Games. Math. Oper. Res. 38, 2 (2013),
350–357.
Yakov Babichenko. 2013. Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous
games. Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013), 130–144.
Siddharth Barman. 2015. Approximating Nash Equilibria and Dense Bipartite Sub-
graphs via an Approximate Version of Caratheodory’s Theorem. In Proc. of STOC
2015. 361–369.
H. Bosse, J. Byrka, and E. Markakis. 2010. New algorithms for approximate Nash
equilibria in bimatrix games. Theoretical Computer Science 411, 1 (2010), 164–173.
Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, and Ariel D. Procaccia. 2014. Biased Games.
In Proc. of AAAI 2014. 609–615.
Gretchen B. Chapman and Eric J. Johnson. 1999. Anchoring, Activation, and the Con-
struction of Values. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 79, 2
(1999), 115 – 153.
Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng. 2009. Settling the complexity of comput-
ing two-player Nash equilibria. J. ACM 56, 3 (2009), 14:1–14:57.
Xi Chen, David Durfee, and Anthi Orfanou. 2015. On the Complexity of Nash Equilib-
ria in Anonymous Games. In Proc. STOC. 381–390.
Artur Czumaj, Argyrios Deligkas, Michail Fasoulakis, John Fearnley, Marcin Jurdzin-
ski, and Rahul Savani. 2015. Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate
Equilibria. (2015).
Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, and Christos H. Papadimitriou. 2009. The
Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium. SIAM J. Comput. 39, 1 (2009), 195–
259.
Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, and Christos H. Papadimitriou. 2007.
Progress in approximate Nash equilibria. In Proc. of EC. 355–358.
Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, and Christos H. Papadimitriou. 2009. A
note on approximate Nash equilibria. Theoretical Computer Science 410, 17 (2009),
1581–1588.
Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos H. Papadimitriou. 2014. Approximate Nash
equilibria in anonymous games. Journal of Economic Theory (2014). To appear.
Joyee Deb and Ehud Kalai. 2015. Stability in large Bayesian games with heteroge-
neous players. Journal of Economic Theory 157, C (2015), 1041–1055.
Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Rahul Savani, and Paul Spirakis. 2015. Computing
Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games. In Algorithmica. To appear.
John Fearnley, Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani, and Troels Bjerre Sørensen. 2012.
Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria Below Two-Thirds. In SAGT. 108–
119.
Amos Fiat and Christos H. Papadimitriou. 2010. When the Players Are Not Expec-
tation Maximizers. In Algorithmic Game Theory - Third International Symposium,
SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings. 1–14.
Daniel Kahneman. 1992. Reference points, anchors, norms, and mixed feelings. Orga-
nizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51, 2 (1992), 296–312.
Spyros C. Kontogiannis and Paul G. Spirakis. 2010. Well Supported Approximate Equi-
libria in Bimatrix Games. Algorithmica 57, 4 (2010), 653–667.
M.K. Kozlov, S.P. Tarasov, and L.G. Khachiyan. 1980. The polynomial solvability of
convex quadratic programming. {USSR} Computational Mathematics and Mathe-
matical Physics 20, 5 (1980), 223 – 228.
Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, and Aranyak Mehta. 2003. Playing large
games using simple strategies. In EC. 36–41.
Marios Mavronicolas and Buckhard Monien. 2015. The Complexity of Equilibria for
Risk-Modeling Valuations. CoRR abs/1510.08980 (2015).
John Nash. 1951. Non-Cooperative Games. The Annals of Mathematics 54, 2 (1951),
286–295.
J. B. Rosen. 1965. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-
Person Games. Econometrica 33, 3 (1965), pp. 520–534.
Haralampos Tsaknakis and Paul G. Spirakis. 2008. An Optimization Approach for
Approximate Nash Equilibria. Internet Mathematics 5, 4 (2008), 365–382.
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. 1974. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases. Science 185, 4157 (1974), 1124–1131.
A. PROOF THAT Y∗TY∗ − 2Y∗KQK ≤ 1− 2QK .
PROOF. Notice from (10) that for all i we get yi = yk +
1
2 (αi − αk). Using that we
can write the term yTy =
∑
i y
2
i as follows for a when y has support size s
s∑
i=1
y
2
i = y
2
i +
∑
i6=k
y
2
i
= y2k +
∑
i6=k
(
yk +
1
2
(αi − αk)
)2
= sy2k +
(∑
i6=k
(αi − αk)
)
yk +
1
4
∑
i6=k
(αk − αi)2.
Then we can see that y∗
T
y − 2y∗Tk qk is increasing as y∗k increases, since we know
from Lemma 5.12 that y∗k > 0. This becomes clear if we take the partial derivative of
y
∗T
y
∗ − 2y∗kqk with respect to y∗k which is equal to
2sy∗k +
∑
i6=k
(αi − αk)− 2qk = 2sy∗k +
∑
i6=k
2(y∗i − y∗k)− 2qk
(
since yi = yk +
1
2
(αi − αk)
)
= 2sy∗k + 2
∑
i6=k
y
∗
i − 2(s− 1)y∗k − 2qk
= 2
s∑
i=1
y
∗
i − 2qk
= 2− 2qk
≥ 0 (since y∗k > 0).
Thus, the value of y∗
T
y
∗ − 2y∗kqk is maximized when y∗k = 1 and our claim follows.
